Statistical treatment choice based on asymmetric minimax regret criteria by Tetenov, Aleksey
                          Tetenov, A. (2012). Statistical treatment choice based on asymmetric
minimax regret criteria. Journal of Econometrics, 166(1), 157-165. DOI:
10.1016/j.jeconom.2011.06.013
Peer reviewed version
License (if available):
CC BY-NC-ND
Link to published version (if available):
10.1016/j.jeconom.2011.06.013
Link to publication record in Explore Bristol Research
PDF-document
This is the author accepted manuscript (AAM). The final published version (version of record) is available online
via Elsevier at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304407611001266. Please refer to any
applicable terms of use of the publisher.
University of Bristol - Explore Bristol Research
General rights
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies. Please cite only the published
version using the reference above. Full terms of use are available:
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/pure/about/ebr-terms.html
Statistical Treatment Choice Based on
Asymmetric Minimax Regret Criteria
Aleksey Tetenovy
This version: January 2011
(First draft: October 2007)
Abstract
This paper studies the problem of treatment choice between a status quo treatment with a
known outcome distribution and an innovation whose outcomes are observed only in a nite
sample. I evaluate statistical decision rules, which are functions that map sample outcomes
into the planners treatment choice for the population, based on regret, which is the expected
welfare loss due to assigning inferior treatments. I extend previous work started by Manski
(2004) that applied the minimax regret criterion to treatment choice problems by considering
decision criteria that asymmetrically treat Type I regret (due to mistakenly choosing an inferior
new treatment) and Type II regret (due to mistakenly rejecting a superior innovation) and
derive exact nite sample solutions to these problems for experiments with normal, Bernoulli
and bounded distributions of outcomes. The paper also evaluates the properties of treatment
choice and sample size selection based on classical hypothesis tests and power calculations in
terms of regret.
JEL classi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1 Introduction
Consider a planner who has to choose which one of two mutually exclusive treatments should be
assigned to members of a population. One treatment is the status quo, whose e¤ects are well
known. The other is an innovation, whose exact e¤ects have yet to be determined. The treatments
in question may be, for example, two alternative drugs or therapies for a medical condition, or
two di¤erent unemployment assistance programs. Suppose that a randomized clinical trial or
experiment will be conducted and its results will be used to choose which treatment population
members will receive.
The planner faces two problems. First, she has to know how much data should be gathered
to get a su¢ ciently accurate estimate of the average treatment e¤ect. Second, she has to select
how treatment choices will be determined based on the statistical evidence obtained from the
experiment. Often, treatment choice is based on the results of a statistical hypothesis test, which is
constructed to keep the probability of mistakenly assigning an inferior innovation (a Type I error)
below a specied level (usually .05 or .01). Then, the sample size is selected to obtain a high
probability (usually .8 or .9) that the innovation will be chosen if its positive e¤ect exceeds some
value of interest.
Following Walds (1950) formulation of statistical decision theory, I analyze the performance
of alternative statistical decision rules based on their expected welfare over di¤erent realizations
of the sampling process, rather than just their probabilities of error. In particular, I continue a
recent line of work investigating treatment choice procedures that minimize maximum regret by
Manski (2004, 2005, 2007, 2009), Hirano and Porter (2009)1, Stoye (2007a, 2007b, 2009) and Schlag
(2007). Regret is the di¤erence between the maximum welfare that could be achieved given full
knowledge of the e¤ects of both treatments (by assigning the treatment that is actually better) and
the expected welfare of treatment choices based on experimental outcomes, which is necessarily
lower.
This papers main departure from previous literature on the subject is asymmetric consideration
of Type I regret (due to mistakenly using an inferior new treatment) and Type II regret (due to
1 It should be noted that Hirano and Porter (2009) consider local asymptotic minimax regret criterion, which
di¤ers from the "global" minimax regret considered by other authors listed here and does not generally imply results
about asymptotics of minimax regret over the whole parameter space.
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missing out on using a superior innovation). The persistent use in treatment choice problems of
the hypothesis testing approach, which allows Type II errors to occur with higher probability than
Type I errors, suggests that many decision makers want to place the burden of proof on the new
treatment. Most do so by selecting a low hypothesis test level, such as  = :05. It is not clear
what principles, besides convention, are there to guide the selection of hypothesis test level for the
circumstances of a particular decision problem. Values of maximum Type I and maximum Type II
regret of a statistical procedure could provide the decision maker with more relevant characteristics
of its performance than the traditional hypothesis testing measures (test level and power), since
regret takes into account both the probability of making an error and its economic magnitude.
The asymmetric minimax regret criterion proposed here combines minimax regret with a kinked
linear welfare function that is intended to capture a policy makers loss aversion. Maximum Type
II regret of asymmetric minimax regret solutions is larger than their maximum Type I regret by
a given factor. I show that when treatment e¤ect estimates are normally distributed, hypothesis
testing rules with a given level  correspond to asymmetric minimax regret solutions for some
asymmetry factor K () for any sample size and variance. It turns out, however, that extreme
degrees of loss aversion are needed to obtain treatment choice rules corresponding to hypothesis
tests with standard signicance levels.
Instead of looking at maximum regret values, a Bayesian decision maker would assert a sub-
jective probability distribution over the set of feasible treatment outcome distributions, update it
using the data and maximize expected welfare with regard to the posterior distribution (which is
equivalent to minimizing expected regret). Unfortunately, in many situations decision makers do
not have any information that would form a reasonable basis for asserting a prior distribution. In
group decision making, members of the group may disagree in their prior beliefs. These problems
lead to frequent use of conventional prior distributions in applied Bayesian analysis. Bayesian
treatment choice based on a conventional, rather than a subjective, prior distribution does not
have a strong economic justication. Decision making based on maximum regret is a conservative
approach to dealing with the lack of substantiated prior beliefs, since maximum regret is the sharp
upper bound on expected regret for decision makers with any prior distributions.
Some decision makers will nd asymmetric minimax regret criterion proposed here a simple
alternative to the conventional hypothesis testing method for treatment choice problems, which has
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the advantage of taking into account the magnitude of potential welfare losses in addition to raw
error probabilities. Even for those who arent interested in using the criterion for decision making,
the paper could provide useful insights for understanding the welfare implications of applying
conventional statistical methods to treatment choice problems.
The paper proceeds in the following order. Section 2 exposits the decision-theoretic formulation
of the problem and introduces the asymmetric minimax regret criterion. In section 3, I consider a
simple but instructive case where the experiment generates a normally distributed random variable
with known variance. There I derive asymmetric minimax regret decision rules and establish
their correspondence with hypothesis testing rules. I analyze conventional treatment choice rules
based on hypothesis testing and sample size choice based on power analysis in light of their regret
properties. Section 4 analyzes treatment choice in a more practically applicable setting with binary
or bounded random treatment outcomes. Exact mimimax regret results were obtained for these
problems by Stoye (2009) and Schlag (2007). I extend their results to derive asymmetric minimax
regret solutions using a di¤erent technique and demonstrate that minimax regret solutions proposed
by these authors for bounded outcomes could be suboptimal if the decision maker can place an
informative upper bound on the variance of the outcome distribution, which is the case in many
applications. All proofs are collected in an appendix.
2 Statistical treatment rules, welfare and regret
The basic setting is the same as in Manski (2004, 2005). The planners problem is to assign members
of a large population to one of two available treatments after observing some statistical evidence
of their e¤ectiveness. Let t = 0 denote the status quo treatment and t = 1 the innovation. Each
member j 2 J of the population has a response vector yj (t) describing potential outcomes under
both treatments t. The population is a probability space (J;
; P ) and the distribution P [y ()]
of the random vector y () describes treatment response across the population. The population is
"large," in the sense that J is uncountable and P (j) = 0. The distribution P is ex ante known to
belong to a feasible set fP ;  2  g. Parameter  is called the state of nature.
Population members are observationally identical, thus the treatment assignment decision can
be fully characterized by an action a 2 [0; 1], which is the proportion of population that is assigned
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by the planner to the innovative treatment t = 1 independently of potential outcomes. Proportion
1  a, then, is assigned to the status quo treatment t = 0.
The planner observes an outcome of an experiment X 2 X that is informative about . The
distribution of X depends on the unknown state of nature  and is denoted by Q . A function
 : X ! [0; 1] mapping experimental outcomes into treatment assignment proportions is a statistical
treatment rule (or simply a decision rule). Then  (X) is the action chosen when X is observed.
The set of all feasible statistical treatment rules is labeled D.
First, consider a utilitarian planner whose payo¤ from taking action a in state of nature  is
the average treatment outcome across the population:
U (a; )  (1  a)E [y (0)] + aE [y (1)] = E [y (0)] +   a.
Then the primary statistic of interest to the planner is the average treatment e¤ect
  E [y (1)]  E [y (0)] .
Average treatment outcomes E [y (t)] are assumed to be nite for all t and .
I follow Walds (1950) approach and evaluate statistical treatment rules based on the expected
welfare they yield across repeated samples in each state of nature . If the planners welfare function
is U (a; ) , then the expected welfare of  in state of nature  equals
W (; ) 
Z
U ( (X) ; ) dQ = E [y (0)] + E [ (X)] , (1)
where E [(X)] =
R
 (X) dQ .
In addition to the welfare function to evaluate outcomes the planner needs to specify a criterion
to deal with the uncertainty of . These generally fall into two categories: Bayesian and uniform. A
Bayesian criterion maximizes
R
W (; ) d () for some measure  on the space  , which could be
a probability measure (a proper prior) or innite (improper prior). Uniform criteria treat all states
of nature symmetrically and are not a¤ected by reparametrization of  . Stoye (2010) provides an
extensive comparison of such criteria.
The simplest uniform criterion is: max
2D
min
2 
W (; ), called minimax in statistics when the for-
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mulated objective is to minimize loss. Manski (2004) shows that in a problem of treatment choice
between status quo and an innovation the minimax decision rule is very conservative: the status
quo treatment has to be chosen regardless of experimental data, any other decision rule could yield
welfare lower than E [y (0)] if  < 0.
2.1 Minimax regret
The conservativeness of the minimax criterion has led Manski (2004) and other authors to focus
instead on the minimax regret criterion introduced by Savage (1951). The regret of a statistical
treatment rule  is the di¤erence between the highest expected welfare achievable by any feasible
statistical treatment rule in state of nature  and the expected welfare of :
R (; )  sup
02D
W
 
0; 
 W (; ) .
The highest welfare in state of nature  is achieved by a decision rule that selects the optimal (in
state ) treatment regardless of experimental outcomes. The regret function, then, equals
R (; ) =W (I [ > 0] ; ) W (; ) =
8><>:   (1  E [ (X)]) if  > 0   E [ (X)] if   0. (2)
Regret, then, is the product of the average probability of suboptimal treatment assignment and the
magnitude of the resulting utilitarian welfare loss.
The minimax regret criterion select a statistical treatment rule that minimizes maximum regret
M 2 argmin
2D
max
2 
R (; ) . (3)
Minimax regret does not have the problem of excessive conservativeness highlighted by Manski
(2004), yet remains a very simple uniform decision criterion. Regret (as opposed to the negative
of welfare) embodies the intuitive notion of a loss function, since it normalizes the loss to zero
when an optimal decision is made given the knowledge of the underlying parameters. In estimation
problems with standard statistical loss functions for which L(j^   j)  0 and L (0) = 0, minimax
and minimax regret criteria are identical. Axiomatic properties of minimax regret were rst studied
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by Milnor (1954) and recently by Hayashi (2008) and Stoye (2010); they apply directly to minimax
regret with reference-dependent utility function considered below when the reference point E [y (0)]
is known.
2.2 Asymmetric minimax regret
To allow for asymmetric concern about Type I and Type II errors evident in hypothesis testing, I
consider minimax regret treatment choice with asymmetric reference-dependent welfare functions
exhibiting loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). For an asymmetry coe¢ cient K > 0, let
the welfare function UK be linear2 in the average treatment outcomes with the same slope as U
above the reference point E [y (0)] and a K times steeper below the reference point. Formally,
dene UK as:
UK (a; )  E [y (0)] +
8><>: (U (a; )  E [y (0)]) if U (a; ) > E [y (0)] ,K  (U (a; )  E [y (0)]) if U (a; )  E [y (0)] ,
= E [y (0)] +
8><>:   a if  > 0,K  a if   0.
The expected welfare of a statistical treatment rule  then equals
WK (; ) =
Z
UK ( (X) ; ) dQ = E [y (0)] +
8><>: E [ (X)] if  > 0,K  E [ (X)] if   0. (4)
Ordinal relationships between expected welfare of two statistical decision rules do not depend on
the asymmetry factor K > 0. For any 1; 2 2 D and  2   :
W (2; ) TW (1; )()WK (2; ) TWK (1; ) .
Thus, the set of admissible statistical treatment rules is the same for all asymmetric linear welfare
functions (4) as for the standard linear welfare (1).
2A kinked-linear utility is used for tractability. In Section 3.1 I discuss why this restriction does not have a
substantial impact.
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The regret function for expected welfare (4) equals
RK (; ) =
8><>:   (1  E [ (X)]) = R (; ) if  > 0; K  E [ (X)] = KR (; ) if   0.
The only di¤erence from the regret function for standard linear welfare (2) is the factor K for
  0 which evaluates losses relative to the status at a higer rate. Maximum regret under the
asymmetric welfare function can be expressed through the regret function for linear welfare as
max
2 
RK (; ) = max
 
K  RType I () ; RType II ()

,
where RType I ()  max
:0
R (; ) is the maximum Type I regret (across states of nature in which
the innovation is inferior) and RType II ()  max
:>0
R (; ) is the maximum Type II regret. Type I
regret is the welfare loss due to Type I errors, while Type II regret is the welfare loss due to Type
II errors under the null hypothesis H0 :   0.
Since the asymmetry factor K does not a¤ect admissibility, asymmetric welfare functions could
be considered indirectly by solving the weighted minimax regret problem
min
2D
max
 
K  RType I () ; RType II ()

(5)
for the linear expected welfare (1).
3 Normal experiment
I rst consider an experiment whose outcome ^  N ( ; 2) is a scalar normally distributed random
variable with unknown mean  2 R (the average treatment e¤ect of interest) and known variance
2. If we let 2 = N 120, normal experiments with di¤erent variances are informative for comparing
experiments with di¤erent sample sizes.
It follows from the results of Karlin and Rubin (1956, Theorem 1) that if the distribution of ^
exhibits the monotone likelihood ratio property (which holds for normal and binomial distributions)
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and the welfare function is (1), then the class of monotone decision rules
T;(^) 
8>>>><>>>>:
0 ^ < T ,
 ^ = T ;  2 [0; 1]; T 2 R,
1 ^ > T
is essentially complete (for any decision rule 0 there exists T; such that W
 
0; 
  W (T;; )
in all states of nature). Since P(^ = T ) = 0 for normally distributed ^, a smaller class of threshold
decision rules
T (^)  I[^ > T ]; T 2 R
is also essentially complete and considering other rules is not necessary in this problem.
Given that ^ is normally distributed, the regret of a threshold decision rule T in state of nature
 equals
R(T ; ) =
8><>:  P(^ > T ) =  
 
 1 (   T )

if   0,
P(^  T ) = 
 
 1 (T   )

if  > 0,
the probability of an incorrect treatment choice multiplied by the magnitude of the loss j j.
Substituting h =  1 , maximum Type I and Type II regret could be expressed as
RType I (T ) = max
h0
 h  h   1T 	 ; (6)
RType II (T ) = max
h>0

h
 
 1T   h	 :
These functions have nite positive values for every T 2 R. Lemma 1 shows that the decision
maker faces a trade o¤ between maximum Type I and maximum Type II regret. Higher threshold
values imply lower Type I regret, but necessarily higher Type II regret.
Lemma 1 a) RType I (T ) is a continuous, strictly decreasing function of T , RType I (T ) ! +1
as T !  1 and RType I (T )! 0 as T ! +1.
b) RType II (T ) is a continuous, strictly increasing function of T , RType II (T ) ! 0 as T !  1
and RType II (T )! +1 as T ! +1.
Figure 1 displays the maximum Type I and maximum Type II regret as functions of the decision
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rule threshold T . The scale of both axes is normalized by . The maximum regret max
2 
R (T ; ) =
max
 
RType I (T ) ; RType II (T )

is minimized when RType I (T ) = RType II (T ), which happens
at T = 0 since R (T ; ) = R ( T ; ) and RType II (T ) = RType I ( T ). The minimax regret
treatment rule in this problem coincides with the plug-in rule 0 = I[^ > 0] which assigns treatments
as if the estimate ^ of the average treatment e¤ect was the true value.
The asymmetric minimax regret statistical treatment rule AK under welfare function WK is
uniquely characterized by the equation
K  RType I
 
AK

= RType II
 
AK

.
It is evident from (6) that if TK is the asymmetric minimax regret threshold for  = 1, then the
threshold for other values of  equals TK . The implicit characterization of TK can be rewritten
as
Kmax
h0
f h (h  TK)g = max
h>0
fh (TK   h)g . (7)
The threshold value TK is an increasing function of the asymmetry factor K.
3.1 Comparison with hypothesis testing
Hypothesis tests and power calculations are a general device not explicitly designed to take into
account the magnitude of welfare losses specic to treatment choice problems, hence cannot be
expected, for example, to minimize maximum regret. However, since these techniques are ubiqui-
tously used in treatment choice problems, it is of interest to evaluate their performance in terms of
the regret function, which captures the welfare consequences more fully (for this class of problems)
than the statistical power function.
A conventional one-sided hypothesis test with signicance level  rejects the null hypothesis
(  0) and assigns the innovative treatment if ^ >  1 (1  ). This critical value guarantees
that the probability of a Type I error does not exceed  for any   0. The statistical treatment
rule based on results of a hypothesis test with level  is a threshold rule H() with threshold
H ()   1 (1  ) proportional to the standard error . Thus a hypothesis test based treatment
rule can also be rationalized as a solution to an asymmetric minimax regret problem with asymmetry
10
-2 0 0.411 1.645 2
0.17
0.2813
Threshold T /s
M
ax
im
um
 re
gr
et
 /
s
Maximum Type I regret
Asymmetric Max Type I regret, K=3
Maximum Type II regret
Figure 1: Maximum Type I and Type II regret as functions of the decision rule threshold.
-5 -0.752 0 0.752 1.46 5
0.008
0.17
0.837
q
g
 / s
R
eg
re
t R
( d
, g
) /
s
Minimax regret rule
Hypothesis test rule (a=.05)
Figure 2: Regret functions of minimax regret and hypothesis test based decision rules.
11
Test signicance level Threshold Max Type I regret Max Type II regret K ()
 = :5 (minimax regret) T = 0 :17 :17 1
 = :25 T = :6745 :0608 :3724 6:125
 = :1 T = 1:282 :01877 :6409 34:15
 = :05 T = 1:645 :008178 :8371 102:4
 = :025 T = 1:96 :003665 1:026 279:9
 = :01 T = 2:326 :001304 1:264 969:6
Table 1: Maximum Type I and Type II regret of statistical treatment rules induced by hypothesis
tests based on a normally distributed estimate with variance 2.
factor
K () =
max
h>0

h
 
 1 (1  )  h	
max
h0
f h (h   1 (1  ))g .
K () is the ratio of maximum Type II to maximum Type I regret of the hypothesis test based
decision rule. In this normal model, the correspondence between a hypothesis test based rule with
level  and an asymmetric minimax regret rule with level K () does not depend on the standard
error of , and thus on sample size.
Table 1 provides maximum Type I and Type II regret values and the asymmetry factors corre-
sponding to commonly used hypothesis test levels. Decision rules based on the one-sided  = :05
level hypothesis test would also minimize maximum regret for decision makers who place 102 times
greater weight on Type I regret than on Type II regret. Decision rules based on  = :01 level tests
are minimax regret for decision makers who place nearly 970 times greater weight on Type I regret.
The trade o¤ between Type I and Type II regret is markedly di¤erent from the trade o¤ between
raw Type I and Type II error rates, an  = :05 level test has a 95% maximum probability of Type
II error, which is 19 times higher than the maximum probability of the tests Type I error.
Figure 2 compares the regret functions of the minimax regret treatment rule 0 and the treat-
ment rule H(:05) induced by a hypothesis test with signicance level  = :05 over a range of feasible
values of  . The scale of both axes is normalized by . The maximum Type II regret of the hy-
pothesis test rule is approximately :837; which is nearly ve times higher than the maximum
regret of the minimax regret treatment rule (approximately :17). The hypothesis test rule does
have much lower regret over   0 (:0082 vs. :17 for the minimax regret rule). The hypothesis
test rule generates the largest expected welfare losses relative to the mimiax regret rule when the
innovative treatment is moderately e¤ective.
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Since it is a product of the magnitude of error j j and its probability, regret of any threshold
decision rule converges to zero as  ! 0. Regret of all threshold decision rules also goes to zero for
large values of  because probability of error declines exponentially, while  grows linearly. This
provides an intuition for nding in Manski and Tetenovs (2007) nding that many nonlinear (e.g.
logarithmic) transformations of the planners utility have little e¤ect on minimax regret treatment
rules. Similarly, minimax regret rules computed for a nonlinear loss averse utility function estimated
by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) do not di¤er greatly from those obtained here for kinked linear
utility with the same asymmetry parameter.
3.2 Sample size selection
I will illustrate sample size selection based on maximum regret by comparing it with the conventional
methods. The International Conference on Harmonisation formulated "Guideline E9: Statistical
Principles for Clinical Trials" (1998), adopted by the US Food and Drug Administration and the
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products. The guideline provides researchers
with values of Type I and Type II errors typically used for hypothesis testing and sample size
selection in clinical trials. For hypothesis testing, the limit on the probability of Type I errors is
traditionally set at 5% or less. The trial sample size is typically selected to limit the probability
of Type II errors to 10-20% for a minimal value of the treatment e¤ect that is deemed to have
"clinical relevance" or at the anticipated value of the e¤ect of the innovative treatment.
Suppose that a researcher selects  > 0 as the clinically relevant size of positive treatment e¤ect.
Following the guidelines, she selects the sample size for which the variance of ^ equals 2, where 2
satises the condition that ^ will fall under the 5% hypothesis test threshold H (:05) =  1 (:95)
with probability 10% if  = :
P

^  H (:05)

= 
 
 1 (:95)  = = :1,
 = =
 
 1 (:95)   1 (:1) = :342.
At the chosen value  =  the regret then equals :1. The regret over  > 0, however, is not
maximized at  = , but at a smaller value  = 1:46 = :5 for which the probability of a Type
II error is 57% and the Type II regret achieves its maximum of :837 = :286.
13
The exact rationale for trying to limit the probability of Type II errors to a particular value of
10% at a particular value  is unclear to me, but suppose that the researcher didnt want Type II
regret to exceed :1. If the hypothesis test decision rule was taken for granted, researcher planning
the experiment would then want to select  large enough so that maximum Type II regret (equal
to :837) would not exceed :1. This would require   :12, implying a sample size over eight
times larger than the one selected by conventional power calculations described above.
If a researcher instead planned to use a minimax regret decision rule 0 and wanted a sample size
su¢ cient to limit the maximum regret by :1, she would select a sample size such that :17 = :1,
which would be almost three times smaller than the one derived by power calculations.
4 Exact statistical treatment rules for binary and bounded out-
comes
Exact solutions to the minimax regret problems and exact maximum regret values are available
when the data consists of independent random outcomes of treatment t = 1, provided that the
outcomes are binary or have bounded values. I consider rst the case of binary outcomes and then
its extension to outcomes with bounded values and its limitations.
4.1 Binary outcomes
Let the treatment outcomes of the innovative treatment t = 1 be binary, w.l.o.g. let y (1) 2 f0; 1g,
and let the known average outcome of the status quo treatment t = 0 equal p0  E [y (0)] 2 (0; 1).
Let the set of feasible probability distributions of y (1) be a set of Bernoulli distribution with
means p 2 [a; b] ; 0  a < p0 < b  1 (if p0 is outside of the interval [a; b], then the treatment
choice problem is trivial). The experimental data consists of N independent random outcomes
(x1; :::; xN ), each having a Bernoulli distribution with mean p . The sum of outcomes X =
Pn
i=1 xi
has a binomial distribution with parameters N and p . X is a su¢ cient statistic for (x1; :::; xN ),
so we need to consider only statistical treatment rules that are functions of X.
It follows from the results of Karlin and Rubin (1956, Theorems 1 and 4) that monotone
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statistical treatment rules
T; (X) =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 X < T;
 X = T
1 X > T
; T 2 f0; :::; Ng;  2 [0; 1]
are admissible and form an essentially complete class, thus it is su¢ cient to consider only monotone
rules. The regret of a monotone rule T; equals
R (T ;; ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
 
(
1 
 
B (T;N; p) +
P
T<nN
B (n;N; p)
!)
if   0,

(
B (T;N; p) +
P
T<nN
B (n;N; p)
)
if  > 0,
where B (n;N; p) denotes the binomial probability density function with parameters N and p
and  = p   p0 is the average treatment e¤ect.
It will be convenient to use a one-dimensional index for monotone rules D (T;)  T +(1  ).
There is a one to one correspondence between index values D 2 [0; N +1] and the set of all distinct
monotone decision rules. D = 0 corresponds to the decision rule that assigns all population members
to the innovation, no matter what the experimental outcomes are. D = N + 1 corresponds to the
most conservative decision rule that always assigns the status quo treatment.
Lemma 2 establishes properties of maximum Type I and Type II regret of monotone statistical
treatment rules for binomially distributed X that lead to simple characterisations of minimax
regret and asymmetric minimax regret treatment rules. As before, maximum Type I regret is
RType I ()  max
:p2[a;p0]
R (; ) and maximum Type II regret is RType II ()  max
:p2(p0;b]
R (; ).
Lemma 2 If X has a binomial distribution, then
a) RType I () is a continuous and strictly decreasing function of D () with RType I () = 0 for
D () = N + 1.
b) RType II () is a continuous and strictly increasing function of D () with RType II () = 0 for
D () = 0.
It follows from lemma 2 that there is a unique value of D
 
M

such that RType I
 
M

=
RType II
 
M

. M is the minimax regret treatment rule. While its characterisation is implicit,
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monotonicity and continuity of the maximum Type I and Type II regret as functions of D () makes
computation very straightforward. The same characterisation of the minimax regret treatment rule
for p 2 [0; 1] was derived in Stoye (2009) using game theoretic methods.
Likewise, there is a unique value D
 
AK

such that K RType I
 
AK

= RType II
 
AK

. AK is the
minimax regret statistical treatment rule for asymmetric welfare function WK .
The following proposition derives the exact large sample limit of maximum regret of asymmetric
minimax regret decision rules AK and shows that the same large sample limit is attained by decision
rules derived from the normal approximation
NK  I
h
X=N   p0 > N 1=20TK
i
. (8)
with the threshold value TK implicitly dened by (7) and 0 =
p
p0 (1  p0). For symmetric
minimax regret, this approximation yields the plug-in rule P = N1 = I [X=N > p0]. The limit
is equal to the maximum regret in a problem with N i.i.d. normally distributed outcomes with
variance 20 = p0 (1  p0).
Proposition 3 Asymptotic maximum regret of both minimax regret and plug-in statistical treat-
ment rules is equal to
lim
N!1
p
N max
2 
R
 
AK ; 

= lim
N!1
p
N max
2 
R
 
NK ; 

= 0max
h>0
fh (TK   h)g .
The result in Proposition 3 establishes global asymptotic properties of decision rules over the
whole parameter space  , which do not generally follow from the local asymptotic minimax results
in Hirano and Porter (2009). The result will be used in the following section to highlight one of
the limitations of extending minimax regret decision rules from binomial to bounded outcomes.
4.2 Bounded outcomes
Now consider a more general setting. Let the outcomes of treatment t = 1 be bounded variables
y (1) 2 [0; 1]. Let p0  E [y (0)] 2 (0; 1) denote the known average treatment outcome of the
status quo treatment t = 0. Let fP ;  2  g be the set of feasible probability distributions P [y (1)].
Assume that E [y (1)] 2 [a; b] ; 0  a < p0 < b  1. Also, let fP ;  2  Bg denote the set of all
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Bernoulli distributions with E [y (1)] 2 [a; b] and assume that  B   . The technique outlined
below relies on including all the Bernoulli distributions in the feasible set.
Schlag (2007) proposed an elegant technique, which he calls the binomial average, that extends
statistical treatment rules dened for samples of Bernoulli outcomes to samples of bounded out-
comes. The resulting statistical treatment rules inherit important properties of their Bernoulli
ancestors. Let  : f0; :::; Ng ! [0; 1] be a statistical treatment rule dened for the sum of N i.i.d.
Bernoulli distributed outcomes (as in the previous subsection). Let X = (x1; :::; xN ) be an i.i.d.
sample of bounded random variables with unknown distribution P [y (1)] and let Z = (z1; :::; zN )
be a sample of i.i.d. uniform[0; 1] random variables independent of X. Then the binomial average
extension of  is dened as
~ (X)  EZ
XN
k=0
I [zk  xk]

.
This extension could be described algorithmically (as in Schlag (2007)):
a) randomly replace each bounded observation xi 2 [0; 1] with a Bernoulli observation ~xi = 1 with
probability xi and with ~xi = 0 with probability 1  xi,
b) take the treatment assignment probability prescribed by decision rule  to (~x1; :::; ~xN ),
c) average the assignment probabilities derived in step (b) over repeated independent draws (this
is captured in the formula above by the expectation over the distribution of Z).
The random variables I [zk  xk] ; k = 0; :::; N are i.i.d. Bernoulli with expectation E [y (1)],
thus
PN
k=0 I [zk  xk] has a Binomial distribution with parameters N and E [y (1)]. For any state
of nature , let  be the state of nature in which P [y (1)] is a Bernoulli distribution with the same
mean E [y (1)]. Then E(~) = E () and R(~; ) = R (; ). The regret of a binomial average
treatment rule ~ in state of nature  is the same as the regret of  in a Bernoulli state of nature
 with the same mean treatment outcomes. It follows that maximum Type I (II) regret of ~ in
the problem with bounded outcomes ( 2  ) is equal to maximum Type I (II) regret of  in the
problem with Bernoulli outcomes ( 2  B).
If statistical treatment rule  satises some decision criterion based on maximum Type I and
maximum Type II regret for the feasible set of Bernoulli outcome distributions, then its binomial
average extension ~ satises the same criterion for the feasible set of bounded outcome distributions.
For example, M minimizes maximum regret for Bernoulli distributions. Suppose there was a
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treatment rule ~
0
for bounded distributions that had lower maximum regret than ~
M
. Then 0
would have to have lower maximum regret over  B than M , which would imply that M does not
minimize maximum regret for the problem with Bernoulli distributions.
Binomial average extension yields exact minimax regret and asymmetric minimax regret sta-
tistical treatment rules if the set of feasible outcome distributions   includes the set of Bernoulli
outcome distributions with the same means  B. In many applications, however, the planner knows
that Bernoulli outcome distributions are not feasible. If the outcome variable is annual income of a
participant in a job training program, the planner may assume not only that the variable is bounded,
but also that its variance is much smaller than the variance of a Bernoulli distribution with the
same mean. If Bernoulli outcome distributions are excluded, then binomial average based treatment
rules may not be optimal because binomial averaging articially inates the variance of data from
bounded outcomes to match the variance of binomial outcomes with the same mean. The following
proposition shows that in this case a simple plug-in decision rule P = I
h
N 1
PN
i=1 xi > p0
i
has a
lower maximum regret than a binomial average extension of an exact minimax regret rule M in
the Bernoulli case.
Proposition 4 Let p0 = E [y (0)] and let fP ;  2  g be the set of feasible probability distributions
of y (1) such that E (y (1)  E [y (1)])2 < 2u, where 2u < p0 (1  p0). Let (x1; :::; xN ) be i.i.d.
random outcomes of treatment t = 1. Then
p
N sup
2 
R
 
P ; 
  umax
h>0
fh ( h)g+ o (1) :
Maximum regret of the binomial average extension ~
M
is by design the same as the maximum
regret of the minimax regret treatment rule M in the Bernoulli case. As long as for some  > 0;
  contains distributions with all possible means in a -neighborhood of p0
8p 2 [p0  ; p0 +] ; 9 : E [y (1)] = p,
the results of proposition 3 apply and
lim
N!1
p
N max
2 
R(~
M
; ) =
p
p0 (1  p0)max
h>0
[h ( h)] > umax
h>0
[h ( h)] .
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Thus, for large enough N , max
2 
R(~
M
; ) > sup
2 
R
 
P ; 

. This underscores the importance of
placing appropriate restrictions on the set of feasible outcome distributions before looking for
minimax regret based treatment rules, since rules that are optimal (in minimax regret sense) for a
larger set of feasible distribution need not be optimal for a smaller feasible set.
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5 Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 1 I will prove the results in part a), the proof of part b) is analogous. Note that it is
w.l.o.g. to set  = 1 to simplify notation, then
RType I (T ) = max
h0
f h (h  T )g .
For every xed h < 0,  h (h  T ) is a strictly decreasing function of T . Furthermore, for
any xed T ,  h (h  T ) is a continuous function of h; with lim
h! 1
f h (h  T )g = 0, and
 h (h  T ) > 0 for  1 < h < 0, thus  h (h  T ) attains its maximum on h 2 ( 1; 0).
Therefore max
h0
f h (h  T )g is a strictly decreasing function of T .
To show that max
h0
f h (h  T )g is continuous in T for all T 2 R, lets x T = T0 and pick
some  > 0. Then there exists H < 0 such that h (h  T ) > 1 and h T < 0 for all h < H and for
all T 2 [T0  ; T0 +]. Then for such h and T :
d
dh
f h (h  T )g =   (h  T )  h (h  T ) >
>
 (h  T )
h  T   h (h  T ) =  (h  T )
1  h (h  T )
h  T > 0.
The second line follows from an well known inequality for the normal distribution:
 () <   ()

for  < 0.
Since ddh f h (h  T )g > 0 for all h < H and all T 2 [T0  ; T0 +], the maximum of
 h (h  T ) over h for each T is achieved on the closed interval h 2 [H; 0]: The derivative of
 h (h  T ) with respect to T is bounded on the rectangle (h; T ) 2 [H; 0] [T0  ; T0 +], thus
max
h0
f h (h  T )g = max
h2[H;0]
f h (h  T )g is continuous in T at T0.
For any T < 0
max
h0
f h (h  T )g   T (0) =  T
2
(by substituting h = T ), thus max
h0
f h (h  T )g ! 1 as T !  1.
For any T > 0 and h < 0,  (h  T )  1
(h T )2 by Chebyshevs inequality. Also, di¤erentiation
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of   h
(h T )2 with respect to h shows that maxh0
n
  h
(h T )2
o
is achieved at h =  T and equals 14T .
Then
max
h0
f h (h  T )g  max
h0

  h
(h  T )2

=
1
4T
and 14T ! 0; thus maxh0 f h (h  T )g ! 0 as T !1.
Lemma 2 I will provide the proof for RType I (), the proof for RType II () is analogous.
For a xed , R
 
; 

is a bounded continuous function of p on the closed interval [a; p0], thus
attains its maximum. Also,
jD (1) D (2)j < ") sup
:p2[a;p0]
jR (1; ) R (2; )j < ",
thus max
:p2[a;p0]
R (; ) is a continuous function of D ().
For any xed p 2 (0; p0),
R (T ;; ) =  
(
1  B (T;N; p) 
P
T<nN
B (n;N; p)
)
is a strictly decreasing function of D () = T + (1  ). For p = 0, R (T ;; ) is also a strictly
decreasing function of D () for D () 2 [0; 1] and R (T ;; 0) = 0 for D ()  1. If follows that
max
:p2[a;p0]
R (; ) is a strictly decreasing function of D ().
If D () = N + 1, then T = N; = 0, thus R (T ;; ) = 0 for any p 2 (0; p0).
Proposition 3 It follows from lemma 2 that
min
 
K RType I
 
NK

; RType II
 
NK
  max
2 
R
 
AK ; 
  max  K RType I  NK ; RType II  NK .
If
p
N RType I
 
NK

and
p
N RType II
 
NK

both converge to 0max
h>0
[h (TK   h)], then it follows
that max
2 
R
 
AK ; 

converges to the same limit. I will establish it for
p
N RType II
 
NK

, the proof
for
p
N RType I
 
NK

is analogous.
First, I will show using Berry-Esseen inequality that
sup
p2[p0;p0+N 1=2B]
p
NR
 
AK ; 
! 0max
h>0
[h (TK   h)] , (9)
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and then, using Chebyshevs inequality that for all N
sup
p2(p0+N 1=2B;1]
p
NR
 
AK ; 

< 0max
h>0
[h (TK   h)] , (10)
where
B = max
 
20TK ;

0max
h>0
[h (TK   h)]
 1
; 0 argmax
h>0
[h (TK   h)]
!
:
Let h =
p
N 10 (p   p0) and  =
p
p (1  p), then h 2 [0;  10 B] for p 2

p0; p0 +N
 1=2B

and
p
NR
 
AK ; 

=
p
N (p   p0)P

X=N   p0  N 1=20TK

=
= 0hP

X=N   p  N 1=20TK   (p   p0)

= 0hP
p
N 1 (X=N   p) 
0

(TK   h)

. (11)
The Berry-Esseen inequality with C = 1 (cf. Shiryaev (1995, p. 63,374)) applied to X, which
is a sum of N i.i.d. Bernoulli variables with mean p , yields for every z 2 R
P pN 1 (X=N   p)  z   (z)  p2 + (1  p)2p
N
p
p (1  p)
.
For su¢ ciently large N , p0 + N 1=2B < 1, then for some nite M ,
p2+(1 p)2p
p(1 p)
 M for all p 2
p0; p0 +N
 1=2B

. Setting z = 0 (TK   h) and applying the inequality to (11) yieldspNR  AK ;   0h0 (TK   h)
  0hN 1=2M  N 1=2MB.
Since  has a bounded derivative,
sup
h2[0; 10 B]
0 (TK   h)

   (TK   h)
   (0) sup
h2[0; 10 B]
1  0

(TK   h)
! 0
as N !1, since  ! 0 in the shrinking interval

p0; p0 +N
 1=2B

.
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Combining the results,
sup
h2[0; 10 B]
pNR  AK ;   0h (TK   h)  sup
h2[0; 10 B]
pNR  AK ;   0h0 (TK   h)
+
+ sup
h2[0; 10 B]
0 (TK   h)

   (TK   h)
 .
(9) follows since both terms converge to zero asN !1 and 0max
h>0
[h (TK   h)] = max
h2[0; 10 B]
[0h (TK   h)]
due to the choice of B.
For p   p0 > N 1=2B, (p0   p)+N 1=20TK < (p0   p) =2 < 0, since B  20TK . Applying
Chebyshevs inequality to X=N   p , which has variance 2=N  1= (4N) yields
P

X=N   p0  N 1=20TK

= P

X=N   p  (p0   p) +N 1=20TK


 P (X=N   p  (p0   p) =2) 
 
2
=N
(p   p0)2 =4
 1
N (p   p0)2
.
Then (10) follows from
p
NR
 
AK ; 

=
p
N (p   p0)P

X=N   p0  N 1=20TK


 1p
N (p   p0)
<
1
B
 0max
h>0
[h (TK   h)] .
Proposition 4 Let V denote the variance of a random variable in state of nature  and let
p  E [y (1)]. I will consider the case when p > p0, the proof for p  p0 is analogous.
For all  such that V [y (1)] < 2u=9 (thus V
h
1
N
PN
i=1 xi   p
i
< N 12u=9) the one-sided
Chebyshevs inequality yields
P

N 1
PN
i=1 xi  p0

= P

N 1
PN
i=1 xi   p    (p   p0)

 1
1 + 9N 2u (p   p0)2
.
Applying the result to the formula for regret of the plug-in rule P yields
p
NR
 
P ; 

=
p
N (p   p0)P

N 1
PN
i=1 xi  p0

 u
3

p
9N 2u (p   p0)
1 +
p
9N 2u (p   p0)
2  u6 .
23
To obtain the last inequality, observe that max
z>0
z
1+z2
= 12 .
For all  such that p   p0  6N 1=2u, also apply the one-sided Chebyshevs inequality, using
the assumption that V
h
1
N
PN
i=1 xi   p
i
< N 12u:
P

N 1
PN
i=1 xi  p0

= P

N 1
PN
i=1 xi   p    (p   p0)

 1
1 +N 2u (p   p0)2
.
Applying the inequality to the regret of plug-in rule P yields
p
NR
 
P ; 

=
p
N (p   p0)P

N 1
PN
i=1 xi  p0

 u
p
N 2u (p   p0)
1 +
p
N 2u (p   p0)
2 < u6 .
The last inequality holds because
p
N 2u (p   p0)  6 and max
z>6
z
1+z2
< 16 .
For all  that do not fall into one of the two cases considered above, p   p0 < 6N 1=2u and
V [y (1)] 2

2u=9; 
2
u

: The Berry-Esseen inequality (cf. Shiryaev (1995, p. 374)), applied to the
sum of N i.i.d. random variables (xi   p), yields for any z 2 R
P pNV  1=2 [y (1)]N 1PNi=1 xi   p  z   (z)  E jy (1)  p j3p
NV
3=2
 [y (1)]
.
Substituting z =
p
NV
 1=2
 [y (1)]  (p0   p) gives us
P N 1PNi=1 xi  p0  pNV  1=2 [y (1)]  (p0   p)  E jy (1)  p j3p
NV
3=2
 [y (1)]

 1p
NV
1=2
 [y (1)]
 3p
Nu
.
The second inequality hold because given y (1)  p 2 [0; 1], E jy (1)  p j3  V [y (1)]. The third
inequality follows from V [y (1)]  2u=9.
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Applying this inequality to the regret formula for P yields
p
NR
 
P ; 

=
p
N (p   p0)P

N 1
PN
i=1 xi  p0



p
N (p   p0)


p
NV  1=2 [y (1)]  (p0   p)

+
3p
Nu


 V 1=2 [y (1)]max
h>0
h ( h) + 3 (p   p0)
u
 umax
h>0
h ( h) + 18N 1=2:
The second inequality uses substitution h =
p
NV
 1=2
 [y (1)]  (p   p0). The last inequality uses
p   p0 < 6N 1=2u.
The three cases considered are exhaustive of all states of the world  with p > 0. If V [y (1)] <
2u=9; or V [y (1)]  2u=9 and p   p0  6N 1=2u, then since max
h>0
[h ( h)] > 1=6,
p
NR
 
P ; 
  u
6
< umax
h>0
[h ( h)] .
If V [y (1)]  2u=9 and p   p0 < 6N 1=2u, then
p
NR
 
P ; 
  umax
h>0
h ( h) + 18p
N
,
thus
p
N sup
2 
R
 
P ; 
  hmax
h>0
[h ( h)] + o (1).
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